http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/science/02angier.htmlI have always held that we experience form, not just abstractly or figuratively, but even down to our psycho-physiological roots: the "psychic" is "somatic." How we do this and the manner and extent to which we do it is largely unknown and, in any case, problematic.
The article illustrates that contemporary psychology is finally beginning to solve the dichotomy between "mind" and "body," between "abstract" and "concrete," between "figurative" and "literal," and thereby open up the discussion in new terms of what we used to consider (among other things) as "ontology" and "phenomenology." Philosophical dialectics about "existence" have only left us with insoluble questions.
What Cullervo has experienced is the "metaphor" of Athena in his own terms. An abstraction such as "belief in the existence of..." only confuses and disguises what was how he "felt" that "idea," and I am not about to dispute either his "belief system" or his apprehension of his experience. I am an atheist, for example, and I had one "mystical" experience and one "Hermes" encounter. Those had to do with the "experience" of the
atheist of whatever "imagery" he had of those ineffable things in his mind, and nothing to do with the body of philosophy that subtends
atheism. Cullervo's "Athena moment" has nothing to do with polytheistic dogmatics about existence or orthopraxy. You can't shift to those issues directly from his experience or use those issues to qualify it any more than you can use Pythgoras' theorem and the proper use of a protractor to infer a "Bach moment."
To restate matters, if I enter a theater and suspend disbelief and suffer for poor Hecuba, that's an experience that's not qualified by the existence or absence thereof of a "real" Hecuba. The whole metaphoric cosmos of Hecuba has been experienced in my psychophysiology, and I'm to be grateful for it.
This "do you believe or don't believe" bit, I think, is a poison pill for Hellenismos. It's miserably monotheistic in flavor, just like the jump from "faith" to rigorously expounded formal doctrine.
I am
curious about Cullervo's experience, but I am not and can not be an "authority" on it or what should be made of it. What matters to me is how my imagery of existence changes following it or how it expresses and interprets what I do. That may or may not be shared with Hellenismos. If it is, then there's some community of shared minds and shared actions, and, if it's not, then there's not.
It's only in priestcraft, the sort of stuff that strangles institutional religion, that people stop being curious about the experience and start to wax authoritative on what it is, was, and should be.
Cullervo's experience was one of our "primitive" apprehensions of our symbols. All the rest is derivative and debatable.